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APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Gary Haller pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, the district court
sentenced him to seven years, with two years fixed. Mr. Haller appeals, and he contends the
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Haller with three drug offenses: felony possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (marijuana),
and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.24–25.) These charges arose from a traffic stop and
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search of Mr. Haller’s vehicle. (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),1 p.3.) Pursuant to plea
agreement, Mr. Haller pled guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance. (Tr. Vol. I,2
p.11, Ls.3–18.) The State agreed to recommend a sentence of seven years, with two years fixed.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.3, L.24–p.4, L.3.) Mr. Haller was free to argue for less. (Tr. Vol. I, p.4, Ls.4–7.)
At sentencing, the State made a recommendation consistent with the plea agreement.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.7, Ls.9–12.) Mr. Haller requested the district court retain jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.12, Ls.21–23, p.15, Ls.10–11.) The district court sentenced Mr. Haller to seven years, with two
years fixed, and declined to retain jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. II, p.21, Ls.14–19.) Mr. Haller timely
appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.41–42, 44–45.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Haller to seven years, with two
years fixed, for possession of a controlled substance?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Haller To Seven Years, With
Two Years Fixed, For Possession Of A Controlled Substance
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Haller’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732(c) (seven year maximum). Accordingly, to show that the sentence
imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Haller “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
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Citations to the PSI refer to the 359-page electronic document with the confidential exhibits.
There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the entry of plea
hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the sentencing hearing.
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criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460
(2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
“The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to
gain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential and suitability for
probation.” State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005). “[P]robation is the ultimate
objective of a defendant who is on retained jurisdiction.” Id. at 677. The district court’s decision
to retain jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. “There can be no abuse of
discretion in a trial court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient
information upon which to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation.”
Id.
In this case, Mr. Haller asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district
court should have retained jurisdiction in light of the mitigating factors, including his substance
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abuse issues, poor health, acceptance of responsibility, remorse for the crime, and amenability to
mental health and substance abuse treatment.
Fifty-five year old Mr. Haller has been abusing drugs for almost his entire adult life. (PSI,
pp.15–16.) His drug of choice was crack cocaine, but, fortunately, he was able to get sober in
2014 for two years. (PSI, pp.16–17.) Then, at age fifty-three, Mr. Haller started using
methamphetamine and marijuana. (PSI, pp.16–17.) He smoked methamphetamine one or two
times a day. (PSI, p.16.) The GAIN Evaluation diagnosed Mr. Haller with a severe substance use
disorder and recommended intensive outpatient treatment. (PSI, pp.25, 30.) In addition to his
substance abuse issues, Mr. Haller’s physical health is in decline. (PSI, p.15.) He was diagnosed
with Hepatitis-C, but never received any medical treatment for it. (PSI, p.15.) He also has a
degenerative joint and disk disease and arthritis. (PSI, p.15.) Further, Mr. Haller’s mother passed
away in October 2017. (PSI, p.12.) Mr. Haller and his mother were very close, and her death
“devastated” him. (PSI, pp.12, 47.) He believed mental health counseling would benefit him and
he was willing participate in that treatment. (PSI, p.15.) Mr. Haller’s substance abuse issues and
physical health stand in favor of mitigation and support a period of retained jurisdiction.
Despite his struggles, Mr. Haller accepted responsibility, expressed remorse, was highly
motivated to change. He recognized that he made the “choice” to possess illegal drugs. (PSI,
p.39.) He also understood that his drug abuse was not a victimless crime. (Tr. Vol. II, p.16,
Ls.21–22.) He explained to the district court:
And I stand here today before this honorable court to acknowledge that as
a result of my drug use, there have been many victims: my mother and father -my mother recently passed away -- and my father were victims because I allowed
drugs to take their son away and to take away their hopes and dreams on the man
I should have became [sic].
My sister was a victim of my drug use because she never had a brother
that she could look up to or be proud of. My girlfriends, my wife, they were
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victims because they never had anybody that they could lean on or be dependent
upon or have somebody that could offer support or love. My friends were victims
because they lost their companion, the person that shared their interests and
activities. Even my pets, the animals, they were victims because the person that -to take them on walks, to play with them, no longer had time for them. Instead of
being productive and giving back to my community, or being an active part of it, I
became a burden upon it. I draw upon limited resources of the state as evidenced
by my presence here today, and I myself am a victim.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls.1–25.) He acknowledged that he “chose to live in shame and sorrow, hiding
in darkness as I got high, lying, cheating, stealing, hurting those who loved me, as well as those
who never knew my name.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.18, Ls.1–4.) He accepted “all the damages that I have
caused with my drug abuse” and was “truly remorseful.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.18, Ls.5–7.) In the
presentence materials, he wrote, “Today I know that I need help and I’m no longer afraid to
admit that.” (PSI, p.47.) According to the GAIN Evaluation, Mr. Haller showed “high motivation
for treatment.” (PSI, p.27.) His goals were to change his life and take care of his dying father.
(PSI, p.18.) By the time of sentencing, his father was hospitalized for a heart attack and blood
clot in his lung. (Tr. Vol. II, p.18, Ls.10–12.) Mr. Haller hoped to have “a chance to spend some
time with my father before he dies.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.18, Ls.14–16.) He also hoped to fix his drug
addiction, mental health issues, and his behavior. (PSI, p.18.) Mr. Haller’s acceptance of
responsibility, remorse, and motivation for treatment support a period of retained jurisdiction.
In light of these facts, the district court abused its discretion by declining to retain
jurisdiction. Despite his years of incarceration, Mr. Haller never had any substance abuse
treatment. (PSI, p.25.) The retained jurisdiction program would have provided Mr. Haller with
much needed treatment in a controlled environment. After that intensive programming, the
district court would have had additional information to determine Mr. Haller’s rehabilitative
potential and suitability for probation. The district court thus abused its discretion by imposing a
sentence without granting Mr. Haller the opportunity to prove his amenability to treatment.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Haller respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate, including a period of retained jurisdiction. Alternatively, he respectfully requests
that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand his case to the district court for a
new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 24th day of July, 2018.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of July, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, electronically as follows:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
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/s/ Evan A. Smith
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